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INTRODUCTION 
Barry Weingast 
California Institute of Technology 
Pasadena, California 
Theoretical work by several authors suggests that a minimum 
winning coalition (MWC) will determine the decisions of a legislature 
making distributive policy. Riker, Buchanan and Tullock, Riker and 
? 
Ordeshook, and Aumann and Kurz- all conclude that the majority wi11 adopt 
distributive policies that benefit themselves at the expense of the 
minority. These authors also predict that majorities will be 0( �he 
barest possible size, since MW� maximizes the per capita gains for 
the winners. 
Empirical studies of Congress uniformly find that the MWC 
prediction is simply wrong. Nearly all studies report that members 
cf legislatures seek unanimity and are reluctant to exclude minoxltles 
from the benefits of distributive legislation.
3 
Even in the more 
general case of legislative party relations, studies have repeatedly 
shown that majority parties in Congress attempt to work with th� 
minority parties rather than to override them.
4 
This parer presents a modific:ation of the theory of the 
legislature which retains the assumption of self-interested maximizing 
behavior, but yields predictions consistent with empirical observation. 
In addition, this perspective suggests rationales for other features 
2 
of Congress that are commonly reported in the empirical literature: 
the existence of various "norms, " "roles," and "expectations." 
PREVAIL ING THEORIES 
A policy is distributive if the benefits accruing to one 
area can be varied without affecting the benefits received by other 
areas, Such policies exhibit high divisibilities so they can be 
disaggregated and dispensed unit by unit, thereby concentrating the 
benefits while spreading the costs through general taxation. These 
policies are in contrast to "public goods" which must be provided 
to all citizens or to none. The term was originally coined for nine-
teenth century land policies, but as Lowi suggests, it can be " • •
easily extended to include most contemporary public land and resource 
policies; rivers and harbor ('pork barrel') programs; defence procure-
ment and R&D; labor, business, and agricultural 'clientele' services; 
and the traditional tariff."
S 
In axut.lyz.ing <lit> i.L 11.H.:.l..ivc: pU.L.L\...1.t:�, -I: 'I - - J - .. - .__. __ _ V� .LC!)J.::ti.LtlL..A.VI.: 
behavior concentrate upon the consequences of simple majority rule. 
To develop the context of these models, consider a legislature with 
one hundred members, each with a consistent set of preferences over policies 
and outcomes. The legislature is assumed to be an n-person cooperative 
game, which is represented as follows. Suppose that each representa-
tive i proposes a project or program with benefits b
i 
to his district, 
zero to all others, and costs ci distributed over all districts through 
general taxation. If a single project is proposed for a single district, 
it will be defeated by ninety-nine votes to one vote, since the payoffs 
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will be negative to all other districts. 
Since no single project will be authorized, legislators may 
turn to a logrolling mechanism. In this context, logrolling is the 
process by which groups of representatives cooperate to pass each 
other's projects, Any coalition composed of more than half the legis-
lators can ensure passage of their projects and is called a winning 
coalition. 
Both Riker and Buchanan and Tullock conclude that winning 
coalitions will be of minimum size, or fifty-one out of one hundred 
legislators in the above exaaple. That is, the 8ct of MWC is jdentified as 
the "solution" to the legislative game and is considered to be stable 
in the following sense. All that is needed to ensure an outcome is the 
barest of majorities, If a set amount is to be divided up, then 
increasing the number of members in the coalition will serve only to 
decrease the payoff to some or all of the members of the winning 
coalition. If a coalition forms that is bigger than the minimum 
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increase their own payoff by excluding some of the members in the 
larger coalition. 6 Which of the many minimum winning coalitions will 
actually form is not suggested; the theory merely predicts that the 
one that does form will be in this set. 
MOD IFY ING THE THEORY 
The prece d i n g  theory fails to explain universalism, i.e. 
the tendency to seek unanimous passage of distributive programs 
through inclusion of a project for all legislators who want one. 
Indeed, this tendency constitutes evidence against the model. In 
exploring the observed data, it becomes apparent that the model 
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fails to give consideration to an obvious feature of a representative 
process -- the payoffs to a representative and to his district may 
differ. While the district may wish to enrich itself at the expense 
of the rest of the country, the representative wishes to retain the 
prestige and power which accompanies continued membership in the 
legislature. This feature, when explicitly incorporated into a model 
of the legislature, destroys the MWC theory and gives rise to the 
norm of universalism. 
The model that follows is based upon several assumptions. 
The first is that representatives seek reelection. Although this does 
not have to be an end in itself, it is necessary to continue the utility 
derived from the prestige and power obtained by being a member of the 
legislature.7 The second assumption is that districts respond posi­
tively to beneficial legislation: the greater the net benefits received 
bv the district the more likely they are to reelect their representative. 
Further, decisions made by the electorate are based on the net benefits 
accruing to them without consideration of the effects on other districts. 
While the model distinguishes the intentions of the electorate and the 
representatives, it does assume that their interests are related: the 
representative seeks to be returned to off ice and his electoral fortunes 
are related to the benefits he brings home to his district. The more 
successful he is at getting projects authorized, the greater his chances 
of remaining in the legislature. 
The major implication of these assumptions for the analysis 
of distributive policy is that representaL<ves pursuing their own 
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interests will prefer institutional arrangements which increase their 
chances of success in gaining benefits for their district. 
Universalism is such an institution. Rational self-interested 
legislators have compelling reasons to prefer decision making by maximal 
rather than minimal winning coalition.8 The argument can best be com-
municated by an example. 
Suppose each of our one hundred legislators proposes a project 
that benefits his district by $100 and costs $50. Should a minimum 
winning coalition form, fifty-one legislators will band together to pass 
each other's projects. The net payoff to their districts will be $74.50, 
which is $100 minus their district's share of the total costs ($25.50 or 
1% of 51 x $50), The payoff to the legislator is a greater chance of 
reelection for insuring a project for his district. 
For members not in the coalition the payoff to the district 
will be negative: they pay their share of the total costs, 1% of 51 x $50 
for a net payoff of -$25.50. For these legislators, the payoff is an 
lni..:rt:c1:>t:U. du1m,;t: uf Ut:£ecai.. fui. having ubi.alnt:d a negative payoff for
the district. 
A priori, of course, no legislator can be sure that he will 
be a member of the winning coalition, and hence of how distributive 
programs affect his chance of reelection. From this standpoint, if all 
coalitions are equally likely, any given legislator has a 51 percent chance 
of being in the winning coalition, which yields an expected payoff of 
51% ($100 - .Olx5lx$50) + 49%(0 - .Olx5lx$50) = $25.50. 
In contrast, if the legislature were te operate under a 
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universalistic norm, all projects would be approved. Each district then 
receives an expected payoff of $100 - 1% x 100 x $50 • $50, which is greater 
than $25.50. Moreover, each legislator is then more likely to be reelected. 
Under such conditions rational legislators will choose a decision rule of 
universalism rather than MWC. 
The pursuit of reelection is not the only reason legislators 
would rationally choose to institutionalize and maintain a tradition 
of unanimous coalitions.
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In addition to increasing the ex ante proba-
bility of reelection, unanimity reduces the uncertainties they face 
if MWCs are to be formed. Also, institutionalizing the coalition of 
the whole reduces the time and energy used to negotiate the formation 
of the winning coalition. This time can be used pursuing other actions 
related to the objectives of the members. 
Once universalism has been accepted as an institutional rule, 
the legislator must decide whether to include a project (previously, 
the decision also included the choice of a strategy to become part of 
the MWC). This decision can be modeled as a noncooperative game and 
has a Nash equilibrium solution. The choice is whether to propose a 
project, given that all other districts are getting a project. As 
long as the project brings a net benefit to the district, it is in 
the interests of the representative to propose one. 
Consider again one hundred legislators indexed by i, Each 
could propose a project bringing benefits, bi' and costs, ci. The 
decision for any legislator, j, is between the following strategies. 
(1) Propose a project and receive net benefits bj 
- .01 x (Ic1) or 
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(2) Fail to propose a project and simply bear the district's share 
of all other costs - .01 x ( r ci). · �
Strategy (1) is preferable to (2) as long as b
j 
is greater 
than O.lcj or, in words, the benefit/cost ratio of the project is 
greater than 1/100. Thus the equilibrium strategy is a project for 
every district as long as one can be found that provides benefits 
that exceed 1 percent of the costs. 
A natural objection to the preceding analysis poses short­
term against long-term rationality. In the long term all the 
legislators do better under universalism. But in the short term what 
prevents an impetuous group of legislators from proposing a bill with 
projects for just a bare majority? Obviously, a universalistic rule 
must include further features that give individual legislators an 
incentive to follow the rule at all times. What "maintenance 
mechanisms" are there to support this rule or "norm"? 
One possible answer lies in the procedural rules and institutional 
structure of the l�gislature. For example, a rule may be adopted to prevent 
poaching. If a member attempts to remove a project by floor amendment 
or otherwise obstruct the process, then remove his project instead. Though 
this rule is rarely invoked, it occasionally is used. Ferejohn reports 
that Senator Proxmire's attempts to reduce the pork resulted in the 
curtailment of his pet project.10 More recently, Senator Buckley of 
New York proposed a series of amendments removing a project or two 
for every state from the public works legislation. Only the two 
amendments removing projects from New York passed, Similarly, this 
rule provides potential penalties to a member seeking to build a MWC. 
Those who make the attempt may lose their share.11
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A second, non-ins.titutional factor inhibits attempts to 
form MWCs: the repetition inherent in the legislative process. In 
the next session a new MWC might form. If exclusion from the legislative 
benefits implies a much greater risk of defeat, then legislators 
will be even more reluctant to make the attempt for short-run gain out of 
fear of losing next time. 
In order for the legislature to adopt universalism, legisla-
tors must perceive that the benefits of projects generally exceed 
the costs. Assuming each legislator's project has the same benefits 
and costs!2the proposal to adopt universalism yields net benefits to 
each legislator of b - .01 x lOOc, in contrast to MWC expected benefits 
of .Slb - .01 x Slc. The former exceeds the latter only if b is 
greater than c. Hence a rational legislator will vote to adopt univer-
salism only if the expected benefits are positive, Yet this conclusion 
is at odds with scholarly observations of many distributive policies. 
The very term pork barrel connotes eKpenditures that are not economi-
cally warranted. Empirical studies abound with examples of public 
works projects for which the "benefits" exceed the costs only because 
of the wildedt assumptions that lie behind the calculations. 
Two factors help explain why universalism persists after 
the objective basis for its adoption has vanished. First, legislators 
rarely receive 100 percent of the vote.13 Sixty percent is usually considered 
a large plurality. Since most districts are not composed of a homogeneous 
group of constituents, representatives cannot hope to capture 100 percent 
of the vote. A legislator is successful in obtaining reelection if he builds 
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a majority coalition or constituency within his district. The basis 
of this coalition is an amalgam of positions on issues, including 
issues other than distributive programs, such as regulatory or re­
distributive policies.14 Thus a representative may consciously choose 
a supporting constituency that contains only a comfortable majority 
of the district population. This implies that the institution of 
universalism may continue even though the net return on projects is 
negative. If a representative has built a supporting constituency 
that represents, say 60 percent of his district, then projects with 
negative rates of return may still be included if the benefits can 
be concentrated among the supporting coalition c:·d if b > .60�.15 
Second, over time projects are chosen with successively 
lower.rates of return. This reflects rational legislators choosing 
those projects with the greatest net benefits first. As the process 
continues, the net benefits of the projects decline a�d eventually 
become negative. 
Once universalism is adopted, cooperative action by all 
legislators is no longer required, and each proposes his projects 
individually. As the projects being proposed no longer meet the 
criterion b > . 6c , the process takes on the familiar form of the 
prisoner's dilemma. Acting individually, legislators will still 
continue to propose projects (until b < .006c, since each supporting 
constituency receives all the benefits and only 60 percent of one 
percent of the costs of its own projects). Consequently the institution 
may remain after it has ceased producing net benefits. 
Constituents will not necessarily find it rational to 
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hold their representatives responsible for the persistence of pork 
after it ceases to provide them with net benefits. A legislator is 
only one vote in the legislature. Acting by himself, though perhaps 
making a valiant attempt (as either Proxmire or Buckley may have been 
doing), one vote is not likely to alter policy. At the same time, 
the legislator retains the ability to get the district its share. 
As Fiorina argues, constituents may indeed be satisfied with this 
type of role.16 If voters perceive their ability to change the 
system, acting through their legislator, to be negligible, it is 
rational for them to approve (reluctantly) of this role.17 
Eventually, electoral incentives will· favor removing pork 
barrel expenditures when net benefits become sufficiently negative. 
A new cooperative action may remove or alter the nature of the now 
counterproductive institution, thereby increasing the flow of net 
benefits to the constituencies. Ihis cai. be accomplished by canceling 
the program or by altering its scope and jurisdiction. The latter 
alternative has the potential to widen the set of possible projects 
to include some with positive net benefits. 
Indeed, widening the scope of the process rather than dis­
mantling a committee's jurisdiction has occurred frequently in recent 
years. As Ferejohn reports, "The Corps' function has expanded 
dramatically in the last thirty years. Projects for the protection 
of wildlife, the construction of recreation facilities, the improvement 
of water supply and quality, and the stimulation of regional economic 
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development have all been authorized by Congress for the Corps of 
Engineers during this time period • • • •  Ihis expansion has enabled 
the Corps to avoid cutting back its budget and staff as earlier 
functions have declined in importance. ,.lB In particular the recent 
amendments to the Water Pollution Control Act (1956 and especially 
1972) authorizing construction of sewage treatment plants gave the 
Corps a boost as their more traditional function has become less 
valuable. 
These modifications to the theory of the legislature provide 
a rationale for the pork barrel as a structure to serve member goals. 
It further predicts that this cannot remain unaltered indefinitely. The 
process must either be halted entirely or dramatically changed. 
POLICY CONSEQUENCES 
In addition to affecting member goals differently from 
unmodified majority rule, universalism has &n effect on policy outcomes. 
In the case of no constituency differentiation within the district 
the pork barrel system becomes an electoral liability once the benefits 
are no longer greater than their costs. This provides an incentive to 
�lter the process as was discussed above. In contrast, under MWC the 
process will not become a liability until the benefits are less than 51 
percent of the costs. Since fifty-one projects arc built under MWC, 
a district receiving a project pays only 1% of 51 x c. Consequently, 
the net benefits to the district are positive if b > .5lc. This implies 
that pork barrel will continue longer under unmodified majority rule than under 
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universalism. Alternatively more inefficiency (or pork) is possible 
under MWC than universalism. 
The results remain if the possibility of the political 
rewards differing from the economic rewards is assumed. Recall that 
a congressman who has built a supporting constituency of 60 percent 
of his district receives positive benefits under universalism as 
long as b > .60c�·9 With this supporting constituency, under MWC 
rules, a project will yield positive political rewards of b > .51 x .60c 
or b > • 3lc. 
The conclusion that simple majority rule allows more 
inefficient policies than unanimity is not new. Buchanan and Tullock 
argue that unanimity is required to insure that only efficient 
20 projects will be chosen.
. 
Their conclusion and the results of this 
paper are derived from similar models so this consistency is not too 
surprising. 
The literature is not fully supportive, however. Barry 
argues that unanimity has the greatest potential for pork since it 
distributes a "Veto" to every voter.21 Each individual, pursuing 
his own self-interests, is likely to demand special benefits in return 
for his cooperation. Therefore, unanimity will maximize the pork 
if all voters pursue this strategy. However, in terms of the above 
model this argument makes little sense. If, indeed, all voters pursue 
the strategy of choosing a project such that .Ole < b < c then any 
one individual can make himself better off by vetoing the whole 
proposal. Since all are demanding pork, the payoff to any individual 
22 
voter will be b - .01 x lOOc • b - c < O. 
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One possible way of intepreting Barry's claim is to examine 
a legislature where the majority rule is qualified to allow a subset 
of voters a veto.2
3 
Those legislators possessing veto power ��y be 
able to extract more pork than unmodified majority rule. In the simplest 
case, assume majority rule subject to only one legislator's veto. 
This legislator will be in any MWC that forms, and may demand more 
projects than any other legislator, potentially increasing the pork 
barrel. A more detailed investigation of this social choice rule is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper provides an instrumental basis for the social-
psychological norms observed in most real world legislatures. In doing 
so, it follows Fenno and others in interpreting these norms as the 
informal structure or rules of the lcgislature.2
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In the Power of the 
Purse Fenno begins the discussion of the House Appropriations Committee's 
structure in these terms. 
Next, 
In the.first place, the committee must develop an institutional 
decision-making structure. In the second place, the Committee 
must maintain or stabilize the decision-making it created. [p. 127) 
. The basic elements of the Committee's internal structure 
are its differentiated roles • • • .  RolE0 consist of clusters 
of norms. [p. 128) 
The idea of control mechanisms completes the definition of an 
operative norm. Two such mechanisms are of special importance 
to the Committee on Appropriations. The first is the socialization 
process . • • the second is the sanctioning mechanisms applicable 
" u 
to all members of the committee which operates to reward the 
observance of appropriate norms and punish deviations from 
them. [p. 208] 
As argued here, legislators find it in their own self-interests 
to establish norms and form institutions to further their goals. Observing 
that different institutions imply different outcomes, which affect member 
goals differentially, a rationale exists for establishing one set of 
norms over another.25 
This perspective suggests possible explanations for other 
norms discussed in the literature. These informal rules of the 
legislatur� serve to further collective goals and indivi-
dual member's goals. Consider the dual norms of specialization and 
reciprocity which support the committee system. These norms foster 
the development of legislative expertise in a specific area so that 
complex proposals on diverse subjects· can be considered simultaneously. 
Consequently the Congress as a whole need not consider each bill and 
individual representatives need not study and research the details of 
all legislation. The reciprocity rule provides the incentives to 
specialize by delegating the decision power of the legislature in a 
particular area to a specific committee. Individual members thereby 
gain greater influence in a particular area. Since representatives 
tend to be members of committees related to their constituency's 
26 interests, members can use this influence to shape policies closer 
to their constituency's needs or preferences than if these policies 
were to be drafted by a random collection of members!7 Individual 
legislators consequently have an incentive to support the committee 
system through following the reciprocity rule. 'ntus, like the norm 
of unanimity, the specialization and reciprocity norms will have an 
effect on a representative's electoral fortunes and on the nature of 
the policies written by the legislature. 
1 .  
2.  
3.  
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